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In this paper we bridge the gap between special interest politics and
political business cycle literature. We build a framework where the inter-
play between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting
power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles.
We apply our set up to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure
composition, aggregate expenditures and real exchange rates.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, there has been a great improvement on the understanding
of the mechanisms by which special interest politics a⁄ect economic outcomes
(Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1996, 2001). In this literature, special interest
politics and elections are linked through campaign contributions. Those are
o⁄ered to policymakers by lobbies in exchange for a tilted economic policy in
favor of the interests they represent. The economic content of the distorted
policy does not please voters, but it is compensated by the favorable ideological
bias induced by the campaign contributions.
Another older strand of the political economy literature, the political busi-
ness cycle literature, relates electoral cycles on macroeconomic variable to either
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1partisan (classical references are Hibbs 1977, and Alesina 1987) or opportunis-
tic motives (e.g. Nordhaus 1975, Lindbeck 1976, Cukierman and Meltzer 1986,
Rogo⁄ and Silbert 1988, Persson and Tabellini 1990, and Rogo⁄ 1990), both
unrelated to special interest politics.
While special interest politics is often associated with microeconomic policy,
and its macroeconomic impact is thought to be negligible, the political busi-
ness cycle models explain cycles on aggregate macroeconomic variables. In this
paper we try to bridge the gap between special interest politics and political
business cycle literatures. In our framework, the in￿ uence of special interest
groups impact macroeconomic variables that have a distributive impact in so-
ciety, generating electoral cycles in those variables.
In the simple framework we propose, opposite interests divide the society
in two groups: one with the lobby power, and the other with the majority of
votes. Government policy may a⁄ect the distribution of resources in the society
between those two groups. This setup has several applications.
One application is on the distribution of resources in an unequal society
between the poor and the rich. One may think that public expenditures are
mostly bene￿cial to the poor, while its tax burden is heavily levied on the
rich. In this context the poor would like more government spending, leading to
higher taxes. This policy is detrimental to the interests of the rich. According
to our model, lobbying by the rich may generate electoral cycles in government
expenditures .
There is widespread evidence on political business cycles involving ￿scal in-
struments (Shi and Svensson 2002 a,b, and Persson and Tabellini 2002).1 The
political budget cycle in aggregate variables has been interpreted as being caused
by the signalling of an opportunistic government in a model where there is asym-
1According to Brender and Drazen (2004), the evidence on aggregate data is mainly due
to the political budget cycles in ￿new democracies￿.
2metric information with respect to the incumbent￿ s competency (Rogo⁄ 1990,
and Rogo⁄ and Silbert 1988). Our model provides an alternative explanation
for the political budget cycles.
However, recent empirical studies have emphasized the importance of elec-
toral cycles on the composition of the ￿scal budget (on US, see Peltzman 1992;
on Canada, see Kneebone and McKenzie 2001; on Mexico, see Gonzalez 2004;
on Colombia, see Drazen and Eslava 2005a). Our framework may also gen-
erate such cycles. Assuming that public expenditures are speci￿c to di⁄erent
groups in society, we are able to generate electoral cycles in the composition of
government expenditures.
Another application is on exchange rate policy. There is some recent evi-
dence of real exchange rate cycles around elections in Latin America, with more
appreciated exchange rates before than after elections (Frieden and Stein 2001,
and Ghezzi, Stein and Streb 2004). A more appreciated exchange rate bene-
￿ts the majority of the population, while there is often lobby by the tradable
sector for more devalued rates. Hence our framework can be applied to ex-
plain these exchange rate cycles (see also Bonomo and Terra 2005, for a related
explanation).
In our proposed framework, electoral cycles are generated by the interplay
between political in￿ uence of a special interest group and the voting power of
the majority of the population. The mechanism behind the cycle is engendered
by the incumbent trying to signal that she has not been captured by the special
interest group, biasing her policy in favor of the majority of the population
before election.
The policymaker may choose to bene￿t a special interest group through her
policy choice in exchange of part of the group￿ s net gain with it. Keeping in
mind that there can be no formal contract to enforce the deal, it is realistic to
assume that it may fail to be implemented. That is, with some probability the
3deal is implemented and the policymaker receives the agreed upon amount, but
there is some probability the deal falls apart, resulting on an adverse outcome
for the policymaker. This adverse outcome may be explained by the deal may
becoming public, resulting in an election defeat. Another possibility is that the
unsuccessful deal is not revealed to the public but the policymaker dislikes being
betrayed.
We consider deals that are informal agreements, where the policymaker ben-
e￿ts the lobby group and, in return, will be compensated in the future. For ex-
ample, former policymakers are often chosen to integrate the supervisory board
of large corporations. Such deals are not self enforcing, hence they depend on a
repeated relationship between the policymaker and the lobbyist.2 Some agents
interact in several instances over time, possibly while performing di⁄erent roles.
As a consequence, we think of the probability of a successful deal as depending
on factors such as how well the lobby and the policymaker know each other,
how much they trust each other, what other relations and connections they
have between them.
The voters do not observe the probability of a successful deal between the
lobby and the incumbent because they are not aware of all connections between
them. Neither they observe whether a deal between them was set. They can
not perfectly infer that information either, for we assume economic policy is
observed with noise. This assumption is consistent with Downs (1957) analysis,
according to which an individual voter does not have the incentive to spend
resources to get informed, since she cannot a⁄ect the election results.
The voters would like to pick the politician with less connections with the
lobby, since it will be more likely that she will not set a deal with the lobby after
election. To increase her reelection probability, in the period before election the
2This dependence of repeated interactions to enforce a deal is a wider phenomenon, perme-
ating the economic relations in economies where the formal institutions are not well developed
(see Dixit 2004).
4policymaker close to the lobby has an incentive to disguise her proximity. She
does so by choosing a policy less favorable to the special interests group than
the one she would choose if there were no reelection concerns. Analogously, the
policymaker far from the lobby, on her turn, will tilt her policy in favor of the
majority group to signal her larger distance. This behavior generates policy
variables cycles around election.
Note that the incumbent￿ s motivation for wanting to be reelected is the
possibility of receiving personal bene￿ts for favoring the lobby after elections,
which will depend on her policy choice. Hence, we have built in an endogenous
rent from being in o¢ ce, instead of resorting to the exogenous ￿ ego rents￿ , which
is pervasive in the political economy literature.
The model generates an additional cycle, which is a ￿contracting￿ cycle
around elections. Since reelection concerns induce the policymaker to favor
less the special interest group, the mutual net gains from a deal between the
incumbent and the lobby are reduced before elections. Therefore, it is less likely
that the policymaker will make a deal with the lobby before elections than after
elections.
Our model di⁄ers from the special interests politics literature with respect
to the impact of the association between the lobby and the policymaker on her
election prospects. Here, setting a deal with the lobby jepardizes her reelection
chances wheareas, in that literature, the lobby o⁄ers campaign contributions to
the incumbent that increases her reelection likelihood. This di⁄erence stems
from the type of policy variable the lobby aims at in the two contexts. The
special interest politics literature explains the impacts of lobbying on microeco-
nomic variables. The level of such variables should not be of concern to the
majority of the population, hence it should not impact signi￿cantly election
results.
There are two dimensions in which our model departs from previous political
5business cycle models. First, its key tension is on the distribution of resources
between two groups in society: one with the lobby power, and the other with the
voting power. This allows us to generate cycles not only in the level of macroeco-
nomic variables that have distributive impact, but also in directly distributive
variables.
Second, it mixes adverse selection and moral hazard features. The ￿rst
generation of PBC rational models, initiated by Rogo⁄ and Silbert (1988) and
Rogo⁄ (1990), is characterized by hidden information about the policymaker￿ s
competence, who chooses an action to signal her type. In equilibrium her type
will be revealed. An unappealing feature of these models is that only the most
competent incumbent distorts policy.
A more recent generation of PBC models proposes a moral hazard frame-
work to handle this problem (e.g. Lohmann 1998, Persson and Tabellini 2000,
and Shi and Svensson 2002). They propose a simple twist in the adverse models:
the incumbent chooses her action before knowing her own type. This assump-
tion impels both types of incumbents to choose the same policy. Although the
incumbent￿ s action is not observed by the electorate, the observed economic out-
come ends up revealing her type as it is determined by the interaction between
her competence and the chosen policy. Those models generate the desired result
- in equilibrium both types distort policy-, at the expense of an unappealing one
- both types choose the same policy.
In our framework, di⁄erent types of incumbents choose di⁄erent policies,
as in the adverse selection models, and distort policies before elections, as in
the moral hazard models. The main departure from adverse selection models
driving our results is that policy is observed with noise. This assumption yields
the incentive for both types to distort policy, as the incumbent￿ s type can never
be perfectly inferred by the voters.
This feature has some important implications. One advantage of a noisy
6signal is that a large range of results is consistent with the equilibrium strate-
gies, each one leading to a di⁄erent belief on the incumbent￿ s type. Then, the
equilibrium does not depend on the arbitrary speci￿cation of out of equilibrium
beliefs, which is common in signaling models. Moreover, we do not need to
assume an exogenous popularity or ￿ looks￿shock to make the election result
uncertain, as in the adverse selection models.
Other models relate to this paper in generating cycles in distribution of
resources. In Bonomo and Terra (2005), an exchange rate cycle distributes
income between tradable and nontradable sectors. Voters are unsure about the
weight given to their group in the policymaker￿ s preference, and observe policy
with a noise. Exchange rate cycles around elections are thus generated. In
Drazen and Eslava (2005b), voters su⁄er from the same information asymmetry
with respect to the incumbent￿ s preferences but are also uncertain about how
sensitive is their group￿ s voting behavior to government expenditures. The
result is a cycle in expenditure composition. Another alternative model of cycle
in the expenditure composition is provided by Drazen and Eslava (2005a), where
policymakers preferences are formulated in terms of types of expenditures.
Shi and Svensson (2002b) present empirical evidence that supports the mech-
anism of this paper, where the cycles are generated by policymakers who dis-
tort policy in exchange for bribes, or personal bene￿ts. They show that political
budget cycles are more accentuated in countries with higher corruption and rent
seeking indicators.
We start by developing a simple but general framework, and then provide
three applications. In the ￿rst one, presented in more detail, government chooses
the composition of expenditure between the two groups. In another variation,
expenditures bene￿t the people and taxes are paid only by the lobby group.
Finally, we have an exchange rate application, where the tradable sector is
associated with the lobby while the nontradable sector is associated with the
7majority of the population, and the policymaker chooses the real exchange rate
level.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set up the basics
of the general framework. In section three we solve the optimal policy problem
under lobby in￿ uence in a one period setting. The dynamic problem is studied
in section four. Section ￿ve applies this model to explain electoral cycles in
government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures and real exchange
rates. The last section concludes.
2 Model Set up
Society is divided into two groups. One group, which we call people, is the
majority (proportion n of the population, n > 0:5), and de￿nes the elections
outcome. The other group is organized and e⁄ective in lobbying for policies
that favor their interests.
Government chooses an economic policy, which, by convenience, we model
as a strictly positive variable g. This policy a⁄ects utility of the two groups
in opposite directions. Let vi (g) be the indirect utility function of a citizen of
group i, i = p (people);l (lobby), when the policymaker implements policy level
g. Without loss of generality, we assume that the people bene￿t from higher
values of g, whereas, for the lobby, the lower the g the better. That is, v0
p (:) > 0
and v0
l (:) < 0. We also assume vi (:) to be concave.
We assume that the welfare function of a benevolent policymaker is utilitar-
ian:
U (g) = nvp (g) + (1 ￿ n)vl (g); (1)
hence she would optimally choose:
g￿ ￿ U0￿1 (0): (2)
8Now we add the possibility that policymaker receives some personal bene￿t e c
from the lobby in exchange of a policy choice favoring this group. As we describe
later, there is a possibility that the lobby forsakes the agreement, implying a
random e c. In this case, the policymaker will be deceived, su⁄ering a loss of
utility e X.
We extend the lobby and policymaker preferences to contemplate this more
complex interaction between them.
The lobby group utility function becomes:
E [vl (g;e c)] = vl (g) ￿ E (e c):
Policymakers￿well-being depends not only on the citizens￿welfare but it is
also a⁄ected by the personal bene￿ts e c and the loss from being deceived e X. We
assume that policymakers￿preferences with respect to uncertain outcomes can
be represented by expected utility:
f W
￿




nvp (g) + (1 ￿ n)vl (g;e c) + ￿e c ￿ e X
i
;
where ￿ is the relative weight the policymaker gives to receiving personal bene￿ts
vis-a-vis citizens￿utility. We assume that ￿ > 1, so that the policymaker has a
net bene￿t from receiving transfers from the lobby group.
Now the policymaker￿ s utility depends not only on the direct impact of his
policy choice g on the groups￿utilities but also on the personal bene￿ts and
losses that may result from his interaction with the lobby group. The personal
bene￿ts she may receive from the lobby depends on the distortion of policy in
favor of this group. We assume that she is able to take hold of a portion B from
the net gain she creates by distorting policy in favor of the lobby group:
c(g) = B (1 ￿ n)[vl (g) ￿ vl (g￿)]: (3)
This can be interpreted as being a result of a Nash bargain, where B depends
9on the bargaining power of the policymaker vis a vis the lobby group.3
As discussed in the introduction, we think of those deals as informal aggree-
ments where the policy is chosen ￿rst and the personal bene￿ts will be received
in the future. Therefore, it is possible that the policymaker does not receive the
contribution, since such deals are not self enforcing. In fact, they depend on a
repeated relationship between the policymaker and the lobbyist. The probabil-
ity that the policymaker will receive the agreed upon bene￿t later on depends
on factors such as extent of their repeated interaction, on the ability of the
policymaker to punish the lobbyist in other dimensions. We take these connec-
tions between the lobbyist and the policymaker as exogeous, and determining
the probability ￿ that the deal is sucessful. This probability will be the source
of the information asymmetry between the policymaker and the median voter
in the dynamic setting.4
When the policymaker does not receive the bene￿t she incurs in a reduction
of X in her utility, instead of an increase of c(g). We interpret this as an
emotional cost from being deceived. An alternative interpretation is that, when
the deal falls apart, it is revealed to the public. This revelation changes the
policymaker￿ s reelection probability, which, in this case, leads to a loss incurred
in case of a broken deal. We explore this venue in Appendix A.
The policymaker chooses ex-ante whether to distort policy and enter a bar-
gain with the lobby group or not, maximizing her utility function, which in this
particular situation can be represented by:
W (g;I;￿) = nvp (g) + (1 ￿ n)fvl (g) ￿ I￿B [vl (g) ￿ vl (g￿)]g +
+I f￿￿B (1 ￿ n)[vl (g) ￿ vl (g￿)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Xg;
3One may argue that, once the policy is chosen, the lobbyist has all the bargaining power.
However, we think of this bargaining as being determined by the repeated interaction between
the policymaker and the lobbyist along their lives.
4The type variable should actually be bidimensional, depending both on the probability of
a successful deal and the bargaining power of the policymaker. For simplicity we ignore the
extra dimensionality introduced by the the latter.
10where I is a indicator function that equals 1 when the policymaker bargains
with the lobby group and zero otherwise. The equation can be written as:
W (g;I;￿) = U (g) + I f￿b[vl (g) ￿ vl (g￿)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Xg, (4)
where b ￿ (1 ￿ n)(￿ ￿ 1)B.
3 One period problem
Let G be the optimal policy level chosen by the government in the one period
problem. We derive the optimal policy choice under contract (I = 1) and when
no deal is set (I = 0). The optimal contracting decision is the one that yields
the policymaker the highest utility.
In this one period setting, the optimal policy choice when there is no deal
with the lobby is that of the benevolent policymaker, that is, G = g￿.
The optimal policy level when there is a deal between the policymaker and
the lobby is de￿ned by:
g# = argmaxW (g;1;￿);












Proposition 1 The policy choice under a deal with the lobby favors the lobby
group to the detriment of the people when compared to the utilitarian policy,
that is, g# < g￿. Furthermore, the policymaker will favor more the lobby group




Proof. Using equation (2), we have that Wg (g￿;1;￿) = ￿bv0
l (g￿) < 0. Since
W (:) is concave in g, g# < g￿. Using the implicit function theorem in the ￿rst









l (g#) < 0:
11The incumbent will choose to distort the policy, setting a deal with the lobby,
if her welfare under the deal is higher than the one when there is no deal. That











= W (g￿;0;￿) (6)
de￿nes the probability ￿ for which the incumbent is indi⁄erent between setting
or not a deal with the lobby.
It is easy to see that the left hand side of equation (6) is increasing in ￿,
while the right hand side is independent of ￿. Thus, ￿ is a cuto⁄level such that
the government sets the deal with the lobby whenever ￿ ￿ ￿.
We can summarize the results above in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For given values of n, X and b, there is a cuto⁄ probability ￿,
0 < ￿ < 1, de￿ned implicitly in equation (6), such that the incumbent will set a
deal with the lobby if, and only if, ￿ ￿ ￿.
If ￿ < ￿, then g = g￿.
If ￿ ￿ ￿, then g = g# < g￿, where g# is de￿ned implicitly in equation (5).
4 The dynamic problem
In this section we solve the dynamic problem, where there is an election at every
other period. The main features of our story can be told in a simpler and clearer
two-period setup, with an election between them. In Appendix B we sketch a
more general multiperiod framework.
The probability of a successful deal ￿ is the source of information asymmetry
between the policymaker and the median voter. We assume that there are two
12types of policymakers, ￿f < ￿c, re￿ ecting the connection strength between the
policymaker and the lobbyist.5
Those connections are likely to be persistent, since they are forged in a
long-run relationship between the incumbent and the lobbyist. However, the
deal is established by individuals in government and lobby key positions. The
assignment for those positions may change, even over the same mandate.
In order to capture those features in the simplest way we assume the types
to be randomly assigned to the politician in the period in before election from
a Bernoulli distribution, with Pr(￿ = ￿f) = p and Pr(￿ = ￿c) = 1 ￿ p.6
4.1 After election problem
Since the after election period is the last one, there is no signaling component
in the government￿ s policy decision then.7 In this case, the proposition 2 for the
static problem still applies.


















+1 are, respectively, the after election optimal expenditure and
decision of having a deal with the lobby or not, ￿ is de￿ned implicitly in equation





5In our notation, f stands for "farther from the lobby" and c for "closer to the lobby".
6A popular alternative used in the literature is to assume that the policymaker￿ s speci￿c
characteristic is determined by a MA(2) process, as, for example, in Rogo⁄ (1990). This
would generate equilibria with four di⁄erent policy choices for the government at each period,
unecessarily complicating the analysis.
7It is also true that there is no signaling component in the government￿ s policy decision
after election in the multiperiod setting, since there is a new draw for the policymaker￿ s type
in between elections.
134.2 Pre-election problem
4.2.1 The voter￿ s problem
We assume that government policy is observed with noise. Speci￿cally, we
assume that the people observe b g, which is given by:
b g = ge￿;
where ￿ is a Gaussian shock with mean zero and variance ￿2. This may jus-
ti￿ed as resulting from voters￿rational inattention (see Sims, 2003, for some
applications of rational inattention to economic problems).8
We also assume that the people do not observe the policymaker￿ s type ￿.
Hence, voters will try to infer ￿, given the observed policy. There will be a
signaling game between the incumbent and the voters.
The median voter, not belonging to the lobby group, would like to vote for
the policymaker who will choose a policy more favorable to the people after
election. It is clear from Proposition 1 that this will be the policymaker farthest
from the lobby, ￿f. Since there is no information about the opposition, it is
assumed that the probability of it being far from the lobbyist is equal to the
unconditional probability.
The median voter chooses her candidate by comparing the (updated) prob-
ability of the incumbent being of type ￿f to that of the opponent. As the
opponent is not in power, it is assumed that the probability that she is of type
￿f is equal to the unconditional probability p. Thus, if the updated probability
about the incumbent￿ s type is larger than p, people will vote for the incumbent,
and she will be reelected. Otherwise the opponent will win the election. If
the updated probability is equal to the unconditional probability, we assume
that the incumbent is reelected with probability 1
2. Let ￿ be the median voter￿ s
8Citizens have limited information capacity and they have several other decision problems
to solve that depend on information. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, as a result, they
will be imperfectly informed about most of the relevant variables.





inc; if ￿ > p
opp; if ￿ < p
inc with probability 1
2 if ￿ = p
.
How do voters form their belief ￿? Given the lognormality assumption for
the noise, any level of observed policy could result from any given policy. Then,
every positive level for the observed policy is in the equilibrium path. As a
consequence, the median voter￿ s belief is generated by the updating of his prior
belief over the incumbent￿ s type using Bayes￿rule. Thus, the updated proba-
bility is:
￿ = Pr(￿t = ￿f jb gt = b g) = (8)
=
p ￿ f(b gt = b g j￿t = ￿f )
p ￿ f(b gt = b g j￿t = ￿f ) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ f(b gt = b g j￿t = ￿c)
,
where b g is the observed policy level, and f(:j:) is the conditional density function
of b g given the policymaker￿ s type. The voter will vote for the incumbent, that
is ￿ > p, if and only if:
f(b gt = b g j￿t = ￿f ) > f(b gt = b g j￿t = ￿c): (9)
This rule is intuitive. The voter revises upwards his prior that the govern-
ment is of the distant type if, and only if, the observed policy level is more likely
under the distant type￿ s policy than under the policy chosen by the type closer
to the lobby.
4.2.2 Reelection probability
Now we can calculate the incumbent￿ s reelection probability as a function of the
chosen policy level. To do so, it is necessary to specify the incumbent￿ s actions




which will be used by the voter to update his beliefs.
A chosen expenditure level g and a noise ￿ will determine the observed
policy level, b g = ge￿. Therefore, the conditional density function of b g given the
15policymaker￿ s type f(:j:) is equal to the density function of the noise ￿ that
would yield b g when the policy level is the one chosen by this type in equilibrium.
That is,
f(b gt = b g j￿t = ￿i) = ￿
￿




where ￿ is the density of the standard normal distribution. Figure 1 illustrates
the density function of the observed policy, for a given policy chosen.
Figure 1: Observed policy density function
Then, we can write the conditions for reelection in equation (9) as:
￿
￿









In the case of a separating equilibrium, with Gf > Gc, the policy has a cuto⁄
level g, such that, whenever the observed policy level is larger than g (b g > g),



















16Figure 2: Policy Cuto⁄ Level
Figure 2 depicts the density functions of the observed policy when the policy
level is the one chosen by each type of incumbent in equilibrium, ￿f and ￿c. The
￿gure also shows the cuto⁄ level of the observed policy g. Note that condition
(11) is satis￿ed for b g > g.
For a chosen policy g, the reelection probability (q (:)) is the probability that




￿ Pr[b g > g] = Pr[ge￿ > g] =
= Pr[￿ > lng ￿ lng];










where ￿(:) is the normal cumulative distribution function. The reelection prob-
ability is increasing in g; and it is greater than 1
2 if, and only if, g > g. Figure
9More precisely, the probability of reelection is equal to the probability of the observed
expenditure being strictly greater than the cuto⁄ level pluas half the probability of the ob-
served expenditure coinciding exactly with the cuto⁄ level. However, under our continuous
distribution assumption, the latter probability is zero.
17Figure 3: Probability of reelection
3 illustrates the probability of reelection for a chosen policy level g and for the
two types of incumbent equilibrium strategies, Gf and Gc, which determine g.
Suppose, alternatively, that there is a separating equilibrium with Gc > Gf
(we will see later that this equilibrium is not possible). Then, since voting is
prospective, the median voter will still prefer the policymaker further away from
the lobby, although she will choose a lower policy level before election. As a
consequence, the inference problem is reversed, and the probability of reelection










Now q is decreasing in g, since a lower g increases the probability that the
incumbent is of the distant type.
Finally, in the case of a pooling equilibrium, we have always ￿ = p. Thus,
the probability of reelection is 1
2 and will not be a⁄ected by any deviation from
equilibrium strategy.
Then, we can summarize the dependence of the probability of reelection



















; if Gf < Gc
1
2 if Gf = Gc
, (12)








4.2.3 The Incumbent￿ s Strategy
Let FW (￿i) be the after election utility of the type ￿i government, when re-
elected:







+1 is the expenditure and Ii
+1 is the decision of setting or not a deal
with the lobby, optimally chosen after elections by the reelected incumbent of
type ￿i. Note that:
FW (￿i) ￿ U (g￿); (13)
since it is always possible to the policymaker not to make a deal with the lobby
and to choose policy level g￿. Moreover, the policymaker will be strictly better
o⁄ being reelected if her proximity to the lobby enables her to get rents from
being in power.
When the incumbent is not reelected her utility will be the benevolent one,
since we assume that there is no additional source of personal income or loss of
reputation when the policymaker is not in o¢ ce. Let FU be the expected after













Since the policymaker will have no rents when she is not reelected, the best
outcome for her is to have the new incumbent setting policy level g￿. When
one of the opposition types chooses to set a deal with the lobby, an assumption
19we make,10 her policy choice yields the defeated policymaker a lower utility
compared to that resulting from g￿, thus:
FU < U (g￿): (14)
Combining equations (13) and (14), we have that:
FU < FW (￿i): (15)
This last inequality implies that the policymaker always strictly prefers to
be reelected. Remember that rents are generated by the potential deal between
the policymaker in power and the lobby. Since those rents will depend on the
policy implemented, they are endogenous. The di⁄erence FW (￿i)￿FU has the
same role as the exogenous ￿ego rents￿extensively used in the political economy
literature.
In equilibrium, the two decisions - the policy level and to set a deal or not



























and where ￿ is the incumbent￿ s discount rate and the function q is given by
equation (12).
10As we argue below, after elections the incentives are more favorable to a deal. If we
assume functional forms and parameter values such that no deals are set after elections, the
model will generate only an uninteresting pooling equilibrium with the utilitarian policy g￿
chosen before and after elections.








[FW (￿i) ￿ FU] + ￿FU;
which makes clear that a higher reelection probability increases the utility of
the incumbent whenever it is advantageous for one of the types to set a deal
with the lobby after election.
Whenever reelection increases utility, the incumbent policymaker will choose
a policy which will depart from the static optimal level - the one that maximizes
W(g;￿i;I). As we will show below, the only type of equilibrium consistent with
this possibility has Gf > Gc. This makes q increasing in g (equation (12)),
and the optimal level of g higher than the static one for both types.11 As the
after election policy choices coincide with the static optimal choices, there will
be policy cycles around elections, with policy favoring more the people before
elections than after elections.
4.3 Equilibrium









s.t. g > 0,
11Formally, let G
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s.t. g > 0.
We can sum up the conditions for an equilibrium, when it exists, as follows.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies, when it exists, should satisfy
the following conditions:
1. after election an incumbent of type j will choose to make a deal with
the lobby whenever its type ￿j < ￿, where ￿ is de￿ned implicitly by
equation (6), and sets policy level g# if she has a deal with the lobby and
g￿ otherwise;
2. before election an incumbent chooses to set a deal or not with the lobby
and the policy level to maximize her expected intertemporal utility func-
tion, that is, to solve problem (16), where the probability of reelection
function q(g;Gc;Gf) is given by expression (12);
3. the policy level for each type is a ￿xed point, that solves problems (19)
and (20), respectively.
We assume that the parameter values are such that the type closer to the
lobby bene￿ts substantially from a deal with the lobby after election. This
will produce an equilibrium with the following features. First, Gf > Gc. An
equilibrium with Gf < Gc is not possible, since in this case the probability
function will be decreasing in g and the type ￿c will choose a lower policy level
than ￿f.
Second, there will be policy cycles around elections, that is, policy favors
more the people before elections than after. More precisely, whenever is ad-
vantageous to one of the policymaker types to make a deal with the lobby after
22elections, there will be electoral incentives that stimulate a policy more favorable
to the poor before election than after for each policymaker type.
The third feature is that a deal between the policymaker and the lobby is
more likely to happen after election than before. More speci￿cally, whenever
an incumbent of a certain type makes a deal with the lobby before election,
she will also do it after election, but the converse is not true. A deal with the
lobby is pro￿table for the incumbent only if the policy favors substantially this
group. However, elections induce the policymaker to set a policy more favorable
to the people, reducing the gain of an agreement with the lobby. Therefore an
agreement with the lobby is less likely before elections.
There is no guarantee that a pure strategy equilibrium exists. The model
may not have an equilibrium if the type closer to the lobby bene￿ts only mar-
ginally from a deal with the lobby after election. The argument is outlined in
Appendix C. However, a parameter con￿guration which leads to no equilibrium
is not plausible in the context of the present model. The model relies on the pos-
sibility of deals between the policymaker and the lobby, and on non-observable
comparative advantages of certain types to bene￿t from those deals. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that those deals bene￿t substantially (not marginally) the
type most attracted to them, ￿c, under the most favorable conditions to them,
that is, after elections.
For the same reason, a con￿guration of parameters for which the type closer
to the lobby would not make a deal after elections is not plausible either. This
would yield an uninteresting pooling equilibrium where both types would never
make a deal with the lobby and would choose the same policy g￿ before and
after elections.
235 Applications
5.1 Government expenditure cycles
5.1.1 Expenditure composition cycles
There is evidence of electoral cycles on the composition of the ￿scal budget in
several countries (on US, see Peltzman 1992; on Canada, see Kneebone and
McKenzie 2001; on Mexico, see Gonzalez 2004; on Colombia, see Drazen and
Eslava 2005). We now show how the framework developed above can be applied
to generate such electoral expenditures composition cycles.
In the simple formulation we choose, taxes are ￿xed and there are two types
of public goods, speci￿c to each of the two groups. The government budget
constraint is represented by:
￿ = (1 ￿ n)gl + ngp;
where ￿, gl and gp are taxes, expenditures for the lobby and for the people,





The utility function of a citizen of group i, ui, is represented by:
ui (ci;gi) = ci + loggi, for i = p;l, and ￿ > 1;
where ci is her private consumption, and gi is the amount of the public expen-
diture available to her group. Given that ci = yi ￿ ￿, indirect utility functions
may be written as:






vp (g) = yp ￿ ￿ + logg; (22)
12Note that, in this case, it is economically reasonable to impose an upper bound for gp
(0 < gp ￿ ￿
n) to prevent a negative value for gl. However, this new restriction is never binding
in equilibrium.
24where we use g = gp for simplicity.
Substituting equations (21) and (22) into the utilitarian welfare function of
a benevolent policymaker, represented by equation (1), we get:






where y = nyp + (1 ￿ n)yl is the average per capita income. The benevolent
policymaker would optimally choose:
g￿ = ￿ = gl; (24)
that is, all citizens would receive the same spending level.
The optimal spending level under a deal in a one-period setting, that is, the





Note that in this application we have an explicit solution for the spending level.
It is easy to check Proposition 1: g# < g￿ and g# is decreasing in ￿.
The cuto⁄ probability ￿ de￿ned by equation (6) now becomes implicitly
de￿ned by:
(1 ￿ n + ￿b)log
1 ￿ n + ￿b
(1 ￿ n)
￿ (1 + ￿b)log(1 + ￿b) = X (1 ￿ ￿): (26)
Following the setup above, we are able to show that there will be an electoral
cycle in the expenditures composition, with more spending for the people before
than after election. We provide a numerical example to illustrate the model￿ s
ability to generate electoral cycles.
Numerical example Table 1 presents examples of the three possible equilib-
rium types. The examples di⁄er in the value of the loss X due to an unsuccessful
deal with lobby, while the other parameter values are set constant at: ￿f = 0:25,
25￿c = 0:75, n = 0:7, b = 0:5, ￿ = 0:25, p = 0:5, and ￿ = 0:9 . The ￿rst line
presents the results for a relatively small value for X, 0:01, which makes a deal
with the lobby always bene￿cial to both types before and after elections. We ob-
serve that there is an expenditures cycle for both incumbent types, with higher
expenditures for the people before elections.


















0.01 0.9219 0.8206 0.8889 0.7273 1 1 1 1
0.02 1.0237 0.8122 0.8889 0.7273 0 1 1 1
0.2 1.0195 0.7832 1 0.7273 0 1 0 1
Parameter values:
n = 0:7;￿ = 0:9;b = 0:5;￿f = 0:25;￿c = 0:75;￿ = 0:25
When we increase X to 0:02, we generate additionally a lobby activity elec-
toral cycle. Before the election, a deal with the lobby becomes not advantageous
to the type less connected with the lobby, despite being bene￿cial after election.
In order to increase her reelection probability, the policymaker of this type
prefers to increase her expenditure to the people to a level above the optimal
one, distorting expenditure in a direction opposed to the lobby interests.
Increasing the damage of an unsuccessful deal further, to X = 0:2, will make
even an after election agreement with the lobby not bene￿cial to the distant type
policymaker. However, the close type, having a higher probability of success in
the deal with the lobby, is still able to pro￿t from the agreement, before and
after elections. We still have an expenditure cycle, with the close type choosing
to set a deal with the lobby before and after election, and the distant type not
setting the deal at any time.
Finally, an increase of X to the point that prevents any deal with the lobby
(not presented in the table) will result in an not very interesting type of equilib-
rium. Both types choose to spend ￿ for both types of citizens, before and after
26elections.13
5.1.2 Aggregate expenditure cycles
Electoral cycles in aggregate expenditures can be generated by a simple change
in the model described above. Suppose that the people are not taxed and receive
the only public good. Indirect utility functions become:
vl (g) = yl ￿ ￿, and (27)
vp (g) = yp + logg: (28)
We still assume a balance budget: g = ￿:






If the policymaker chooses to spend g < g￿, she can increase the lobby group
utility by g ￿ g￿ and get a share B(g ￿ g￿). Hence, if she has a deal with the
lobby, she would choose:
g# =
n







where b ￿ [￿ ￿ (1 ￿ n)]B.
With information asymmetry about the two di⁄erent policymaker types,
￿c and ￿f, as before, the model generates electoral cycles in aggregate expen-
ditures. This result is in line with the empirical evidence, as in Brender and
Drazen (2004), Shi and Svensson (2002a,b), and Persson and Tabellini (2002).14
13As common in political business cycle models, a reverse cycle may happen, although with
lower probability, when a incumbent closer to the lobby looses the election for an opponent
of the other type.
14Note that the balanced budget assumption also generates a counterfactual electoral tax
cycle. In a more complex version of the model, we could assume, instead, that taxes are hard to
change and that any eventual budget imbalances could be ￿nanced by government debt. This
setting would generate an intertemporally balanced budget equilibrium with expenditures and
budget de￿cits electoral cycles.
27Moreover, the mechanism in our paper, which is based on policymakers receiv-
ing personal bene￿ts from interest groups, is consistent with the evidence pro-
vided by Shi and Svensson (2002b). They show that political budget cycles are
stronger in countries with higher corruption and rent seeking indicators.
5.2 Exchange rate cycles
There is empirical evidence of exchange rate electoral cycles for Latin American
countries (cross-country evidence for Latin America is provided by Frieden,
Ghezzi and Stein, 2001, and Ghezzi, Stein and Streb, 2004, for Brazil, see
Bonomo and Terra, 2001, Grier and HernÆndez-Trillo, 2004, for Mexico, and
Pasc￿-Fonte and Ghezzi, 2001, for Peru). Bonomo and Terra (2005) presents
a model that generates real exchange rate electoral cycles, in a setting with
informational asymmetry over the policymaker￿ s preferences. Here we derive the
same result in a simpler model based of the special interests politics proposed
in this paper.
Consider a endowment economy with two sectors: a tradable a nontradable
sector. The nontradable sector has the majority of the population, while the
tradable sector has the lobby power. All consumers are assumed to have the













where Ni and Ti are the amount consumed of nontradable and tradable goods,
respectively, and r > 1. Now let e be the tradable good relative price, which is
the real exchange rate. De￿ne g ￿ 1
e As expected, the indirect utility function
is decreasing in the real exchange rate for a citizen in the nontradable sector,
and increasing for the tradable sector:
vN (e) =
￿
1 + g￿r￿￿ 1
r EN, and (31)
vT (e) = (1 + gr)
￿ 1
r ET; (32)
28where EN and ET are the per capita endowment for the nontradable and trad-
able sectors, respectively.









The policymaker may choose to set a more depreciated exchange rate, g < g￿
(which means e > e￿ ￿ 1
g￿) in order to favor the tradable sector and get a share
of its gain. Proceeding as before, we ￿nd that when there is an agreement with















By assuming that there are two types of policymakers, ￿c and ￿f, informa-
tion asymmetry engenders a mechanism by which exchange rate electoral cycles
are generated. The policymaker will choose a more appreciated exchange rate
before than after election.
6 Conclusion
Special interest politics is often associated with microeconomic policy, and its
macroeconomic impact is thought to be negligible. Here we are concerned with
opposite interests which divide the entire society in two groups: one with the
lobby power, and the other with the majority of votes. Government policy may
a⁄ect the distribution of resources in the society between those two groups.
15We implicitly assume that the government manipulates its expenditure level in nontrad-
able goods to make the chosen exchange rate consistent with equilibrium in both nontradable
and tradable goods markets. The government budget can be balanced intertemporally by a
￿xed lump sum tax on each citizen. Cyclical government budget imbalances are ￿nanced by
foreign investors. For an example of a model where the relation between ￿scal policy and
exchange rate is explicitly taken into account, see Bonomo and Terra (2005).
29In this paper we propose a link between special interest politics and political
business cycles. We build a framework where the lobby power of a special
interest group interacts with the voting power of the majority of the population,
leading to political business cycles. The model generates an additional cycle,
which is a ￿contracting￿cycle around elections. Since reelection concerns induce
the policymaker to favor less the lobby group, the mutual net gains from a deal
between the incumbent and the lobby are reduced before elections. Therefore, it
is less likely that the policymaker will make a deal with the lobby group before
elections than after elections.
We showed that those same ideas could be applied to generate cycles around
election in other economic variables, such as government expenditures level, and
the real exchange rate.
The mechanism we propose in this paper does not exclude the operation of
traditional political business cycle channels, as proposed by the opportunistic
and partisan literature. The relative importance of our proposed channel in
explaining the electoral cycle in di⁄erent variables should be investigated in
future research.
Appendix A: When an unsuccessful deal is revealed to the public
In this appendix we drop the assumption that the incumbent incurs in an
exogenous utility loss when her deal with the lobby is not successful. We assume,
instead, that an unsuccessful deal is revealed to the public. In this case, the
policymaker￿ s loss from an unsuccessful deal will be due to the e⁄ect of this
revelation on her reelection probability.
The policymaker preferences are now represented by:
f W0
￿
g;e c; e X
￿
= E [nvp (g) + (1 ￿ n)vl (g;e c) + ￿e c];
30which implies the following indirect utility function:
W0 (g;I;￿) = U (g) + I￿b[vl (g) ￿ vl (g￿)], (36)
where b ￿ (1 ￿ n)(￿ ￿ 1)B.
In this model, both types of incumbent will choose to make a deal with
the lobby after election, as there is no penalty from an unsuccessful deal. The
optimal after election policy chosen is also implicitly de￿ned by equation (5).
Before election, the incumbent will take into account the e⁄ect of the chosen
policy on her reelection probability. Here we will restrict our analysis to the
case in which there exists an equilibrium where, before election, the incumbent
closer to the lobby chooses to make a deal, while the other type does not.
Now the voter observes, not only the policy (with noise), but also whether
there was an unsuccessful deal. Let ￿j be the voter￿ s updated belief that the
incumbent is of type ￿f, after observing b g and whether an unsuccessful deal oc-
curred or not (Ix = j with j = 1 when the deal is unsuccessful and 0 otherwise).
Formally:
￿j = Pr(￿t = ￿f jb gt = b g;Ix = j)
If an unsuccessful deal occurs, the voter will infer that the policymaker type
is ￿f. Therefore ￿1 = 0, and the incumbent will not be reelected.
The updated belief when the voter receives no signal of an unsuccessful deal
is:
￿0 =
p ￿ h(b gt = b g;Ix = 0j￿t = ￿f )
p ￿ h(b gt = b g;Ix = 0j￿t = ￿f ) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ h(b gt = b g;Ix = 0j￿t = ￿c)
;
(37)
where h(b gt = b g;Ix = 0j￿t = ￿i) is the joint density of observing a policy signal
b g and receiving no information about an unsuccessful deal, given the incumbent
type is ￿i.
31It is clear that:
h(b gt = b g;Ix = 0j￿t = ￿c) = ￿c ￿ f (b gt = b g j￿t = ￿c); and (38)
h(b gt = b g;Ix = 0j￿t = ￿f ) = f (b gt = b g j￿t = ￿f );
since the success of the deal is assumed to be independent of the policy chosen
by the incumbent when the incumbent makes a deal with the lobby.
When the voters receive no information about an unsuccessful deal, the
incumbent will be reelected if ￿0 > p, which, after substituting equation (38)
into (37), can be seen to be equivalent to:
f (b gt = b g j￿t = ￿f ) > ￿c ￿ f (b gt = b g j￿t = ￿c):
Given the assumed lognormal distribution for the noise, the cuto⁄ for the







The reelection probability for an incumbent which chooses a policy g and
whether to set a deal I can easily be shown to be given by:
q0 ￿
g;I;Gf;Gc￿








Note that the reelection probability decreases when the incumbent chooses
to make a deal with the lobby.




W0(g;I;￿i) + ￿q0 ￿
g;I;Gf;Gc￿
[FW (￿i) ￿ FU] + ￿FU:
Observe that, when I = 0; V 0 (:) becomes the same function as in the original
problem. However, this does not mean that Gf will be the same as before, since
32it depends on Gc. The closer type faces a di⁄erent objective function, as the
reelection probability is a di⁄erent function of g.
Appendix B: A multiperiod framework
Here we sketch the problem in a multiperiod framework. The main modi-
￿cation is in de￿ning a value function for the incumbent problem and solving
it by dynamic programming. Instead of breaking the value function into one
period pieces, as usual, here it is appropriate to break it into two-period pieces.
Let Y (￿i) be the value function for the type i. Then we have a pair of
Bellman equations:


















[pY (￿f) + (1 ￿ p)Y (￿c)] for i = f;c
where we assumed that once the incumbent looses the election, she will be a
regular citizen forever.
As before, in equilibrium Gf;Gc solves the problem for i = c;f. Then, we
have











for i = f;c
The term between square brackets represents the gain from being reelected,
and we will show that it is strictly positive and greater than the rents from
being reelected once, FW (￿i) ￿ FU > 0. It can be rewritten as:
FW (￿i) ￿ FU + ￿
￿





33In order to evaluate the term between square brackets, note that:
Y (￿i) ￿ U (g￿) + ￿
FU
1 ￿ ￿
for i = f;c,
since in the ￿rst period the incumbent is in charge and g￿ is in her policy
choice set. As for the continuing utility, if she is not reelected, she will get
FU thereafter. If she is reelected, her continuing utility is greater than FU, as
shown in equation (15).
Furthermore, using equation (14), we also have that:











for i = f;c.
which implies:




Hence, this result renders the incumbent a gain greater than FW (￿i)￿FU
from being reelected. Thus, the incentives for getting reelected are even higher,
leading to more pronounced cycles, in this multiperiod setting.
Appendix C: Conditions under which there is no pure strategy
equilibrium
The model may not have an equilibrium if the type closer to the lobby
bene￿ts only marginally from a deal with the lobby after election. The argument
is outlined below.
Let the parameters be such that the policymaker of type ￿c opt for a contract
after election but for no contract before. As we will argue, this happens when
0 < ￿c ￿ ￿ < ", for a su¢ ciently small positive ", where ￿ is the probability
cuto⁄ level de￿ned by equation (26). In this case the incumbent of type ￿c
34chooses to make a deal with the lobby after election and distorts policy. Thus,
FW (￿j) > FU for both incumbent types, that is, they strictly prefer to be
reelected. For this reason, both incumbent types have an incentive to distort
policy to increase their reelection probability. Assume that, in equilibrium,
Gf > Gc, so that the reelection probability is increasing in g (by equation
(12)). The policymaker of type ￿c will face a con￿ ict of incentives between a
policy which leads to a higher probability of reelection - a higher g - and a policy
which will lead to higher personal bene￿ts - a lower g. However, for a su¢ ciently
low " the deal with the lobby after elections is only marginally advantageous
to her, so that the additional electoral incentive makes a deal with the lobby
before election not advantageous. It is clear that the incumbent of type ￿f will
have even less incentives to set a deal with the lobby before elections, since
she faces a higher probability of a bad outcome. Hence, neither incumbent
types set a deal with the lobby before election. Their di⁄erent incentives in
the pre-election policy choice comes from their di⁄erent electoral incentives.
Since FW (￿c) ￿ FU > FW (￿f) ￿ FU, the policymaker of type ￿c will have a
higher reelection gain, therefore she will make a higher e⁄ort to be reelected by
choosing a higher g. That is, Gf < Gc, which contradicts our initial assumption
that Gf > Gc.
An equilibrium with Gf < Gc is not possible either, since in this case the
probability function will be decreasing in g and the type ￿c will choose a lower
policy level than ￿f. Then, the only remaining possibility is a pooling equi-
librium, with both types choosing policy level g￿. However, this cannot be an
optimal choice for type ￿c, since in this case the incentives the policymaker faces
before election are the same she does after election, when she chooses to have a
deal with the lobby.
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